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Abstract—Serious games are potentially powerful tools to
influence users’ preferences and attitudes. However, privacy
concerns related to the misuse of data gathered from the players
may emerge in online-gaming interactions.
This work proposes a privacy-friendly framework for a gaming
platform aimed at reducing energy and water usage, where
players are grouped in teams with the challenge of maintaining
the aggregated consumption of its members below a given
threshold. We discuss a communication protocol which enables
the team members to compute their overall consumption with-
out disclosing individual measurements. Moreover, the protocol
prevents the gaming platform from learning the consumption
data and challenge objectives of the players. Correctness and
truthfulness checks are included in the protocol to detect cheaters
declaring false consumption data or providing altered game
results. The security and performance of the framework are
assessed, showing that scalability is ensured thanks to the limited
data exchange and lightweight cryptographic operations.
Index Terms—Smart Grid; Gamification; Serious Games; Pri-
vacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last years, there has been a significant growth
of interest in game-based approaches aimed at motivating,
increasing and/or influencing users’ activities. Depending on
the specific design of the game-based experience, such ap-
proaches can be classified in two classes: serious games
and gamified interactions. The former category comprises
games used for purposes other than entertainment [1], which
have been successfully used for teaching, training or raising
awareness in domains ranging from education [2] and health
care [3] to resource [4] and demand side management [5].
Conversely, gamified interactions are characterized by “the
use of game design elements in non-game contexts” [6].
They often have a persuasive goal, like promoting a more
sustainable consumption of energy [7] or water resources [8],
or to encourage drivers to undertake a particular behaviour in
order to avoid traffic jams [9].
Several studies on the usage of these game-based ap-
proaches [10], [11] have proven their positive effects on users.
For instance, in the context of energy conservation within
the dwellers of a block of flats, the authors of [12] provide
empirical evidence that the users’ awareness of the behaviours
of the other occupants has a positive impact on their energy
conservation attitudes. In the context of smart power grids,
some utilities employ gamification as part of larger behavioral
demand response approaches to perform peak shaving.
Unfortunately, the use of online gaming implies the emer-
gence of several privacy concerns related to the characteristics
and the exploitation of data collected from the players. In [13],
[14], the authors discuss how information on physical, mental
and social attributes of the players can be inferred based on
collected logs about performed game actions and choices,
whereas in [15] the issues pertaining to ethics, privacy and
trust which emerge in the context of a serious game aimed
at reducing traffic jams in Luxembourg are illustrated. These
concerns become even more threatening if gaming data can
be combined to data related to resource consumption (e.g.
electricity, water or gas usage), which by themselves already
provide private information about users [16].
To overcome such issues, in this paper we provide some
cryptographic mechanisms for an online gaming platform op-
erated by a third-party service. The game application scenario
is a smart electricity or water grid where the utility tries to
influence the behaviour of users in order to indirectly shape
their aggregate consumption curve (e.g. peak shaving). More
in detail, we provide the following novel contributions: i)
the definition of a privacy-friendly gaming framework where
teams of users undertake challenges aimed at maintaining
their overall consumption below a specific threshold set by
the utility; ii) a set of privacy-preserving protocols based on
Shamir Secret Sharing scheme which allow team members
to compute their aggregate consumption without disclosing
individual contributions; iii) a verification mechanism based
on Pedersen Commitments which is executed by the utility
and prevents users from reporting bogus results to the game
platform; iv) the performance assessment and security analysis
of the proposed framework, under assumption that users are
honest-but-curious.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II and III provide a short overview of the related literature
and of the basic cryptographic background notions, whereas
Section IV describes the structure of the privacy-preserving
social game framework. The security analysis and performance
assessment of the proposed framework are provided in Section
V and VI, respectively. Conclusions are drawn in the final
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2II. RELATED WORK
In the last few years, a number of serious games specifically
addressing smart electricity and water grid scenarios have
been proposed (see e.g. [5], [7], [4], [17], [8]). Reference [5]
describes a game platform for demand side management in
smart grids. The game applies a self-organised approach to
regulate the overall energy consumption using a set of social
rules and principles and is implemented through individual
or group challenges, where players are rewarded in case of
achievement of given objectives. The authors mention the
existence of ethics/privacy problems concerning the collection
of metering data gathered from the users’ smart meters,
but does not propose any countermeasure to mitigate such
issues. Similar challenge-based approaches are adopted also in
Reference [7], which designs a game aimed ad reducing home
energy usage and proposes team competitions where groups
of users compete in achieving the lowest team-aggregated
consumption. Reference [8] proposes a gameplay based on a
virtual ’community garden’, of which each user owns a patch.
Players’ water usage measured by the smart meters is reflected
in how much water their plants receive: the more water they
waste in their household, the less is available for plants. Users
compete for the best patch and may exchange tips on how to
optimize consumption.
A more complex game mechanism is proposed in Reference
[17], which designs a gamified water utility portal that allows
users to monitor the water consumption within their household
and implements an awarding system which combines points
and badges to reward positive behaviors, which include actions
aimed at reducing water consumption, learning actions (e.g.
engaging educational activities proposed by the portal), and
data provision actions (e.g. providing detailed information
about the time-of-use of water consuming appliances, which
can be exploited by the utility for consumption forecasting).
Our proposed framework adopts a similar type of challenge
(i.e. multiplayer competitions versus an unmanned challenger)
but includes a communication protocol which avoids the
disclosure of individual consumption data in a scenario where
players behave according to the honest-but-curious model,
(i.e., they try to learn additional information from the observed
data). Moreover, the protocol includes a set of checks to detect
potential cheating behaviours during the game execution. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to embed
privacy-preserving mechanisms in a serious game platform.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Shamir Secret Sharing
Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme belongs to the family
of cryptographic threshold schemes, which are designed to
enable the collaborative reconstruction of a secret. In a (w, t)-
threshold scheme, the secret is divided in w parts called shares,
which are distributed among the protocol participants and can
be reconstructed if at least t ≤ w participants cooperate.
The SSS scheme works as follows: let m ∈ ZQ be the
secret, where Q is a prime number, greater than w and than
all the possible secrets. To split the secret in w shares, the
dealer chooses t−1 integer random numbers ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρt−1
with uniform distribution in [0, Q − 1] and calculates the
s-th share of the secret ν, denoted by the pair (xs, ys)
for 1 ≤ s ≤ w, where xs are distinct integer numbers
and ys = ν + ρ1xs + ρ2x2s + . . . + ρt−1x
t−1
s mod Q. The
secret can be recovered in presence of at least t shares by
using the Lagrange interpolation method. The SSS scheme
is homomorphic w.r.t. addition, meaning that sums can be
performed directly on the shares, leading to the same result
that would be obtained by summing the plaintexts.
B. Pedersen Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme is a two-party cryptographic proto-
col by which a party (Alice) chooses a secret input and gives
to the other party (Bob) a message, called commitment. At a
later stage, Alice reveals the secret and Bob can verify that
the secret was not changed after sending the commitment.
Pedersen Commitment Scheme (PCS) [18] works as fol-
lows. Let G be a group of prime order in which the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) is hard. Let h1 and h2 be two
distinct random generators of G. Alice chooses an input x and
a random number r ∈ Zp, then sends c = hx1hr2 to Bob. At a
later stage, Alice reveals the pair (x, r) and Bob can verify c.
PCS is computationally binding, meaning that Alice needs
to solve a DLP to find a pair (x′, r′) 6= (x, r) that yields the
same commitment. The scheme is also unconditionally hiding,
meaning that for any pair (x, c) there is exactly one r that maps
x into c. Thus, Bob learns no information from c about x. In
addition, the scheme is homomorphic. In fact, given two input
pairs, (x, r) and (x′, r′) such that c is a valid commitment for
(x, r) and c′ is a valid commitment for (x′, r′), then cc′ is a
valid commitment for (x+ x′, r + r′).
Finally, we observe that one way of guaranteeing that h1 and
h2 are generated randomly is using algorithm PickGroup in
[19]. With this algorithm, the seed of the Cryptographically
Secure Pseudorandom Generator serves as a proof that the
algorithm has been executed honestly.
IV. THE PRIVACY-FRIENDLY GAMIFICATION FRAMEWORK
A. General Description and Game Rules
We consider the scenario depicted in Figure 1, which
includes a utility, U , an on-line game platform run by a third
party provider, G, and a set of utility subscribers, P . The
subscribers are equipped with smart meters installed at their
premises, which convey consumption data to the utility.
Players can take part to challenges targeted to groups of
subscribers, which consist in keeping the team-aggregated
consumption below a given threshold T provided by the utility
over a time period B chosen by the users among a predefined
set of options (e.g. one day, one week,...). When B expires, the
challenge results are computed based on the total consumption
of the users and winners are awarded.
More in detail, the game follows the following procedure:
1) When a player p wants to start a new game, he/she
selects the game duration Bp ∈ {B1, · · · , Bn} (where n
is the cardinality of a predefined set of duration options).
2) Periodically, G communicates the players’ choices to U ,
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Fig. 1. The privacy-firendly gamification framework
their choices and communicates to G the lists of team
members. Moreover, U informs the users about their
challenge threshold.
3) Once the game starts, at regular time intervals (e.g. once
every few hours or once a day) team members compute
their aggregate consumption. To do so, at a given time
τ every player pi calculates his/her individual time-
aggregated consumption mτpi from the beginning of the
game period up to the current time τ , based on the fine-
grained meter readings obtained through the local Home
Area Network (HAN) and provides it to the members of
his/her team. It follows that each team player will receive
the individual consumption data of every other player in
the team and will thus be able to compute the team-
aggregate consumption. According to the result of the
aggregation, the player may alter his/her future behavior
(e.g. decreasing his/her consumption).
4) At the end of the game period, each player communi-
cates to G the final team-aggregated consumption. G
verifies the correctness of the received results with U
(which accesses individual measurements via the secure
channel established directly with the meters and may in-
dependently compute the team-aggregate consumption).
5) If a cheat is detected, the game is declared not valid,
otherwise G declares the winner.
B. Security Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
1) Communication between the parties involved in the
protocol is protected from attacks by external parties
by using a secure protocol such as TLS.
2) Each player pi is provided with a smart meter. The
meter is a tamper-proof device sharing a symmetric
key with the utility k(m)iU . The meter periodically sends
measurements to the utility by using some authenticated
encryption scheme.
3) The meter can provide consumption readings at arbitrary
granularity to player devices within the HAN of the
subscriber via a domestic communication channel. The
meter can also generate a commitment for such readings
by using PCS. Commitments are authenticated by using
a symmetric Mac with key k(m)iU . This way, a player can
voluntary disclose meter readings with any granularity
and U can verify the authenticity of such readings.
4) Each player pi is provided by U with an identification
tag IDp.
5) The utility is a honest-but-curious entity. It executes the
protocol honestly, but tries to obtain individual player
measurements having finer granularity than the typical
billing period (e.g. one month) in order to prevent the
inference of sensitive information on the users’ habits.
6) The game platform is also honest-but-curious: it exe-
cutes the protocol honestly, but tries to obtain individ-
ual/aggregate consumption measurements and to learn
the challenge goals of the teams.
7) The players are augmented honest-but-curious entities,
i.e. they execute the protocol honestly but they may
freely choose their inputs. For example, they can pretend
to have a lower consumption.
8) Multiple players may also collude to learn information
about other players’ consumption or to win the game
providing false measurements. The largest collusion is,
at most, the standard team size minus 1.
C. Correctness and Security Definitions
We formulate the security properties in terms of Adversary
goals. The protocol is secure if achieving such goals with
non-negligible probability implies the ability of extracting
information from an unconditionally secure encryption or
solving a computationally hard problem.
P1 G obtains information about the threshold T , the aggre-
gate consumption, or any individual user consumption.
P2 U obtains any information on individual consumption
over the game time scale in addition to what is implied
by knowledge of the aggregate team consumption.
P3 Any collusion of a subset of the players of a team
inputs to the game different measurements than the one
reported by their meter and G accepts the game result.
P4 Any collusion of a subset of players of a team obtains
information about the individual consumption of any
non-colluded user in the team.
D. The Privacy-Friendly Game Protocol
When initializing the system, the gaming platform chooses
and publishes the SSS modulus Q, a prime number p such that
the Decisional Diffie-Hellmann (DDH) problem is hard in Zp,
a large prime q that is a factor of p−1, a random primitive root
g of Zp, two random elements h1, h2, of Zp having order q,
a Key Generating Function, (KGF) and a semantically secure
symmetric encryption scheme, Enc.
Our proposed privacy-preserving game protocol is divided
in the following phases.
Game Setup: With reference to Figure 1, during the initial
game setup the following protocol is executed.
1. GAMESELECTION
pi → G : IDi, gai , Bi
4When a player pi wants to start a new game, he/she
chooses a session secret key ai ∈ Zp and communicates
his/her identification tag IDi, the session public key, gai ,
and the chosen game period Bi.
2. PLAYERLIST
G→ U : (ID1, ga1 , B1), (ID2, ga2 , B2) . . .
At regular intervals (e.g. once a day), G forwards to
U the tuples (IDi, gai , Bi) for each user pi requesting
for participation to the game. Based on such tuples,
U groups the users in an arbitrary number of teams
T1, T2, · · · T|J|. For each team Tj : j ∈ J , U defines
the challenge duration BTj . Moreover, U chooses the
challenge threshold TTj .
3. TEAMLIST
U → G : LTj , gaU , [gametokeni ∀pi ∈ Tj ]
Where gametokeni = Enc(KiU , IDi‖τU‖TTj ). The util-
ity generates a session secret key, aU ∈ Zp, a public
key gaU , and pairwise symmetric keys with each player
KiU = KGF((g
ai)aU ). For each team Tj , U generates an
ordered team member list LTj = [(IDi, gai) : pi ∈ Tj ].
For each team member pi in team Tj , U prepends the
player identifier IDi and the current timestamp τU to the
threshold, then encrypts it with the pairwise key KiU and
sends the team lists and the encrypted values to G.
4. GAMEGOALS
G→ pi : LTj , gaU , gametokeni
For every team TTj , G learns the team composition
and forwards it to each player together with the utility
public key and the relevant encrypted token. This way,
by deciphering the received message the players obtain
the team composition and challenge threshold, but the
challenge threshold remains hidden to the game platform.
Computation of the aggregate consumption: If at time τ the
computation of the team-aggregate consumption is required,
every player pi divides the value of his/her individual con-
sumption mτpi in shares using the SSS scheme with parameters
w = t = |Tj |. For the sake of easiness, we assume that
such shares are obtained by evaluating the SSS polynomial
at points xs = 1, 2, · · · , |Tj |. Player pi keeps the i-th share
(xpii , y
pi
i ) for him/herself (where i indicates the player position
in the ordered list LTj ) and sends each of the remaining shares
(xpik , y
pi
k ) to the corresponding team member pk ∈ Tj \ {pi}
(according to the ordering provided in the list LTj ). Notice
that, every time pi needs to communicate a share to the other
team members, he sends to G the following message:
5a. SENDSHARE
pi → G : [IDk,Enc(Kik, IDk‖τpi‖rpi‖(xpik , ypik ))
∀k ∈ Tj : k 6= i]
The message includes the ID of the player pk to which the
k-th share is addressed and the encryption of the k-th share,
concatenated to the current timestamp, a random number ri
generated by the meter and the ID of pk. In turn, G and
forwards each share to the addressed player with the following
message:
5b. FORWARDSHARE
G→ pk : IDk,Enc(Kik, IDk‖τpi‖rpi‖(xpik , ypik ))
This way, any direct communication between players is
avoided.
Once all the shares have been received, each player pi
computes the i-th aggregate share (XTji , Y
Tj





i and broadcasts it to all the team members. Finally,
every team member applies the Lagrange interpolation method
to decrypt the total team aggregated consumption Mτ =∑
pi∈Tj m
τ





the |Tj |−1 aggregated shares received by the other members.
Once Mτ is known, each player compares it to the amount
τ
BTj
TTj and takes appropriate decisions based on the output
of the comparison.
Verification of the game results: When the game period
BTj expires, to verify the correctness of the reported results







2 . Note that such commitment is authenticated
via a MAC generated by a tamper-proof device. Then, it sends
to the player via the local HAN communication channel:
meter→ pi : τBTj ,m
BTj
pi , rpi , γi,Mac(k
(m)
iU , τBTj ‖γi)
The result verification is then performed as follows:
6. CONSUMPTIONCHECK
pi → U : τBTj , γi,Mac(k
(m)
iU , τBTj ‖γi)
Each player forwards the commitment received from
the local meter to the utility. U then multiplies the













Thanks to the homomorphic properties of PCS, the result
is equal to the one that would be obtained by first sum-
ming the individual consumption measurements m
BTj
pi
and then hashing the aggregate value.
7. GAMEOUTCOME
pi → G : IDi,Γpi , τpi , pi
At the end of the game the final result must be com-
municated to the game platform. To do so, each team
member computes the commitment of the final team-








pi∈Tj rpi using the homomorphic PCS. Then
it sends them to G together with the current timestamp
τpi and the challenge result pi , which is a bit set to 1 if
MBTj ≤ TTj , to 0 otherwise.
As truthfulness check, for every player pi ∈ Tj , G
computes the amount Tjtot =
∑
pi∈Tj pi . If it holds that

Tj
tot 6= 0 ∧ Tjtot 6= |Tj | an alarm message is broadcasted
to all the team members and the utility and the game is
aborted. Moreover, G compares the values Γpi received
5by each team member: if they are not all the same, the
verification fails and the game is aborted.
8. CONSUMPTIONVERIFICATION
U → G : ΓTj , τU
For each team, U communicates to G the amount ΓTj pre-
viously computed and the current timestamp. G compares
each value Γpi received from the players to the value ΓTj
received from the utility. If they are the same, then the
winners are allowed to claim their rewards, otherwise the
game is aborted.
V. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
We now show that the security properties enumerated in
Section IV-B are satisfied by our proposed gaming frame-
work. Note that the correctness of the protocol is a direct
consequence of the correctness of the homorphic aggregation
protocol.
P1 The game platform G only receives public key parameters
or messages encrypted with a symmetric key. To obtain
information about the threshold or any consumption, G
must be able to break either the Diffie-Hellmann key
exchange or the symmetric encryption scheme, both of
which are assumed to be hard to break.
P2 The utility U is involved in the verification steps and
receives: the individual user commitments γi. Thanks to
the hiding property of the commitment scheme, the γis
reveal no information unless h
rpi
2 is known.
P3 The commitment scheme is computationally binding,
meaning that it is hard to find two different measure-
ments that yield the γi. Thanks to the homomorphic
properties of the commitment, it is hard to find two
different aggregate measurements that yield the same
aggregate commitment ΓTj . Since the commitments are
authenticated by means of a tamper-proof device, the
verification phase can be passed only by presenting the
correct aggregate measurement and the correct RTj .
P4 Under assumption that SSS is a perfect secret sharing
scheme, it has been proved in [20] that it ensures un-
conditionally indistinguishable encryption for any col-
lusion of t∗ < w participants. Therefore, assuming
w = |Tj |, unless the whole team colludes, each collusion





i ) received from the other players pj ∈ Tj \ Tj∗
during the computation of the team-aggregate consump-
tion.
VI. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
We now assess the performance of our proposed privacy-
friendly gaming framework in terms of data throughput and
computational burden at each node. In the remainder of this
Section, we assume that the infrastructure implements the
standard AES symmetric cryptosystem operating in Counter
mode (CTR). Note that, on input of a plaintext of m bits,
the output of such cheme is m+ n bits long, where n is the
nonce size. In Table VI we specify the assumptions on the bit
length of the protocol parameters. Based on those, Table VI
TABLE I
ASSUMPTIONS ON PARAMETER SIZES
Notation Length Notation Length
(bits) (bits)
IDp 32 size of the subgroup used in commit-
ments, q
256
Cp 1 symmetric encryption nonce size 128
Bp 4 size of the group used in DH and for
commitment calculations, p
2048
p 1 SSS modulus Q 64
TT 64 τ 32
TABLE II








Game Pl. - 2084 · |P |
Utility 2084 · |P | -
TEAMLIST
Player - -
Game Pl. 2336 · |P | +
2048 · |J |
-
Utility - 2336 · |P | +












Player 1344 · (|Tj | −
1)





|Tj |(|Tj | − 1)
∑
j∈J 1344 ·




Game Pl. - -
Utility 2208 · |P | -
GAMEOUTCOME
Player - 2113
Game Pl. 2113 · |P | -
Utility - -
CONSUMPTION Player - -Game Pl. - 2080 · |P |
VERIFICATION Utility 2080 · |P | -
summarizes the sizes of the input/output data exchanged by
each entity in every phase of the protocol execution. Results
show that the data generated/received at the player side is
limited to a few tens/hundreds of kilobytes, depending on
the number of team members, thus being compatible also
with resource-constrained devices such as portable devices.
Conversely, the throughput of the game platform and the utility
is more consistent due to the quadratic dependency on the
cardinality of the team groups (e.g. 1000 users grouped in 50
teams of 20 members each lead to data volumes in the order
of a few tens of Gbits). However, such entities are assumed to
run the game application on dedicated servers with properly
sized communication capabilities.
Finally, Table IV lists the computational burden at each
node occurring during every protocol phase. The details of the
computational cost of each operation are provided in Table III.
Results shows that the game platform is not involved in any
computation. Conversely, the utility performs computations
only during the game setup and the results verification phases.
The computational effort in terms of number of exponen-
tiations linearly depends on the total number of players,
6TABLE III
LIST OF COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
Notation Description Computational Cost
(number of multiplica-
tions/exponentiations)








Cs(x,w) cost of the generation of w
shares modulo x
O(w2) · Cm(x)
Cl(x,w) cost of a share Lagrange interpo-





Setup 2Ce(2048) (|P |+1) ·Ce(2048)
Consumpt.
Aggr.
(|Tj | − 1) · Ce(2048) +
Cs(64, |Tj |)+Cl(64, |Tj |)
-
Verification 2Ce(2048) + Cm(2048)
∑
j∈Jdlog2 |Tj |e ·
Cm(2048)
whereas the number of multiplications exhibits a logarithmic
dependency on the cardinalities of the player teams. However,
such phases occur only once per game execution and the
temporal horizon of each execution spans one or multiple
days. Therefore, the protocol ensures scalability even in case
of scenarios with several thousands of users (e.g. in case
of involvement of all the citizens of a medium/large-sized
town). Finally, at the player side, the most demanding phases
is the consumption aggregation, where the computational
complexity is dominated by the number of exponentiations,
linearly depending on the team size. However, assuming that
the teams are in the order of tens of users, a few tens of
modular exponentiations are expected to be computed at every
aggregation round (i.e. a few times per each game execution).
Therefore, as long as the team size is limited, the framework
scalability is not hindered.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a privacy-enhanced game platform
aimed at encouraging players to reduce energy/water consump-
tion in their households. To this aim, the platform implements
team challenges against an unmanned adversary. A game
communication protocol is described, which enables to exe-
cute the game without disclosing any individual consumption
measurement and includes a set of correctness checks to detect
cheaters. The security assessment of the proposed framework
is discussed under assumption of honest-but-curious entities.
Numerical evaluations of the computational burden and data
exchange required by the protocol show that the framework is
scalable up to several thousands of players.
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